There is a great debate staged between Ben and Helaina in the comments attached to my previous post (found below). Respectful, informed, incisive, they've really kicked off this blog in the right spirit.
Following in their foot steps, I'd like to open another space for further discursive exchange.
First, I wonder if, proceeding last night's section, any one has given any further thought to two of the questions we posed together:
1) Does nationalism and "nation-ness" grow in proportion to the centralization of the state in which it exists?
and
2)Does nationalism, like the state, require by definition a territorial homeland?
These two questions in particular have been haunting me today, and would welcome critical responses to them.
The answers you give will, I think, help to orient us to the coming section on secession. After all, secession is all about nation-ness, tethered and untethered to a homeland.
In considering your answers to the questions laid above, it might be worthwhile also to ponder a third: When is secession legitimate?
Friday, May 14, 2010
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Exam Grading, Post 1
A provocation:
In grading your exams it occurred to me that quite a few of you argued both in favor of parliamentary representation--nominally because it embodied democratic principles--and yet also for the courts to oversee judicial review. Is there a tension here? It seems to me that in the case of the latter the democratic principles espoused in the former position are sacrificed in favor of an elitist structure of power. I mean, if we like democracy don't we have to trust the people enough as to allow them to decide upon questions of constitutionality? If not, why are we trusting them enough to elect our leaders who appoint those who decide upon a law's given constitutionality?
What do you think?
Remember to read closely the Anderson and the Hobsbawm for tomorrow. The Anderson is especially good I think.
In grading your exams it occurred to me that quite a few of you argued both in favor of parliamentary representation--nominally because it embodied democratic principles--and yet also for the courts to oversee judicial review. Is there a tension here? It seems to me that in the case of the latter the democratic principles espoused in the former position are sacrificed in favor of an elitist structure of power. I mean, if we like democracy don't we have to trust the people enough as to allow them to decide upon questions of constitutionality? If not, why are we trusting them enough to elect our leaders who appoint those who decide upon a law's given constitutionality?
What do you think?
Remember to read closely the Anderson and the Hobsbawm for tomorrow. The Anderson is especially good I think.
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